



SUMNER WELLES

# AND NOW WHAT? A Plan For World Peace

by SUMNER WELLES

(Former U.S. Under-Secretary of State)

*AFTER the war, what? No one can say yet. Peace, as distinct from the Armistice, is a long way ahead. Many people who remember what happened after the war of 1914-18 hope, in fact, that the Peace Treaties—there will be several—will not be drawn up for some years. We must wait and see.*

*But many other people, some of them world figures, have of course been at work for a long time on peace and settlement plans. In addition, preliminary decisions have been made at Conferences of the United Nations. These we summarise elsewhere. But one plan that is bound to attract notice and provoke discussion—that of Sumner Welles, the former American Under-Secretary of State—has been made public. In full it makes a book; but an extended summary appeared in the American magazine "Life," illustrated with maps and diagrams, and "The Listener" has secured the right to use this in New Zealand.*

*It cannot be necessary to add that printing it in this Victory Issue of our journal commits nobody in New Zealand to any degree of acceptance or approval. We print it (1) because the author has lived for several years in the very centre of world politics; and (2) because the first thing most people will wish for, now that the time for dealing with Germany has arrived, will be a draft outline of any possible plan that has intelligence and authority behind it.*

A BASIC decision affecting the stability of the post-war world and the problem of maintaining peace is the part the German people are to be permitted to play in the world of the future. One conclusion is inescapable. During a period of some 200 years the Germanic peoples, and specifically the Prussian people, have been a destructive force in the family of nations. Throughout that time they have never made any constructive contribution to regional or world peace.

What became the motivating force of Prussian ambitions, operating through the brilliant but brutal genius of Bismarck, what actually made possible the creation of the Greater German Second Reich of 1914, was the germ brought to life by a handful of Prussian military scientists. It is their unholy inspiration that brought into being the German General Staff. And that instrument is responsible for the havoc which Germany has been able to wreak upon mankind during the present century.

What is the record of the German people since Bismarck first undertook to carry out the policies of Prussian militarism?

*The war of aggression against Denmark in 1864.*

*The war of aggression against Austria in 1866.*

*The war of aggression, based on falsehood and misrepresentation against France in 1870.*

*The attempt to wage a further war against a too-rapidly recuperating France in 1875, averted only through joint British and Russian pressure.*

*The continuous effort between that date and 1906 to weaken France by insidious interference in her internal affairs, such as at the time of the Dreyfus case, and finally the ultimatum checkmated only by the Conference of Algeiras.*

*The Agadir incident of 1911, which for long months had Europe trembling on the brink of a general war.*

*The policies of political and military aggrandisement having as their*

*inevitable consequence the outbreak of the first World War in 1914.*

To the average person the German General Staff has been nothing more than a board of army generals appointed to determine military strategy, similar in nature to the French, British, or American general staffs. It is there that the basic error has existed. All German foreign policy during the past 75 years, and to a considerable extent German internal policy as well, has either been initiated by, or has required the approval of, the German General Staff. This body has not been an agency of secondary importance in times of peace, as in the democratic states. Nor did it evaporate, as so many of us were led to believe, in the years after Germany's surrender in 1918. Though it went under cover, the organisation remained intact.

## The Partition of Germany

IN thinking about how to deal with the German menace in the future, it is necessary to take as a starting point the assumption that a practical world organisation will be established at the close of the present war, and that it will have the power to enforce decisions believed by us to be expedient and wise.

Germany became a menace to the rest of the civilised world only after two major developments in her history. The first of these was that the German people came to believe in German militarism as the supreme glory of the race. The second development was the centralisation of authority over all the widely-divergent peoples of the German race. With each successive stage in the centralisation of authority, the power of the German General Staff was correspondingly increased. Without such centralisation it could not have attained its position of supremacy in 1914. If Hitler had not abolished all the remaining barriers between the former German states, German militarism could never have carried out its policies so successfully in the years between 1933 and 1939. Nor could it have obtained the

complete control which it had acquired when the war finally began.

Many people will agree that German militarism must be crushed and are satisfied that the major military powers should take care of this as soon as Germany is occupied. They say, however, that there is no similar justification for destroying her present unification. Many responsible Americans are already maintaining that any partition of the German peoples is inherently unjust and will prove unworkable. My whole individual predisposition is in favour of the unity of the German people. It is only because of my conviction that German unity means a continuing threat to the peace of the entire world that I have reached the conclusion that partition is the only way of offsetting the German menace in the future.

The so-called centripetal urge on the part of the German people is far from being the powerful force that so many have claimed during the past 20 years. The vociferous demand for the reconstitution of the German Reich and the unification of all the German peoples has been largely stimulated by the German General Staff. It has provided Hitler with some of his most effective propaganda in consolidating his own regime. Certainly the unification of the German peoples is by no means a pre-requisite for the happiness and prosperity of individual Germans. The several German nations were both happy and prosperous during the 19th century.

Those who favour the continued unification of Germany are inclined to overlook for how brief a period the German states have been governed by a central authority and how bitterly many of the German peoples struggled against unification.

Bavaria, for instance, came under Prussian control 70 years ago and has been a part of the present form of German state for barely a decade. As against this short span, the Bavarian people for over 1000 years had maintained their independent national existence. Is it conceivable that those deep roots established during a millennium of independence and autonomy have been destroyed

in less than three-quarters of a century? Is it possible that the Bavarian people have so soon forgotten their struggle against Prussian domination and their hatred of Prussia, even though they have fought with her in several wars?

It is equally unbelievable that many of the older generations in the former German states do not also still prefer their former autonomy.

If the economic prospects of the German people were to be irreparably damaged by partition, the objections raised on this score would be conclusive. But there is no valid reason why they should be. In my opinion no greater safeguard can be devised against future German military aggression than measures that will afford every German equality of economic opportunity with the citizens of other European countries. He should be assured that he need not look ahead to the same dark and uncertain future that he faced in 1919. Such economic security can be obtained only if basic economic security can be obtained; only if basic economic arrangements which ensure the eventual prosperity of the German people are taken into full account in any division of the present German Reich. Next to the military considerations, these appear to me to be the determining factors.

There is of course not the slightest doubt that many Germans for one or two generations to come will make every effort to evade the results of partition and to pave the way for a renewed unity. For some years they will have to be forcefully repressed by the future world organisation. But the surest guarantee of permanence will lie in the kind of partition undertaken. It will be effective only if it proves practicable from the economic and political standpoints, and is based upon economic, political, and cultural considerations.

## Three German States

IF one proceeds upon the theory that Germany is to be divided solely to prevent her from again becoming a military menace, and that at the same time individual Germans must be given every opportunity to achieve economic security, and ultimately to comprehend and to enjoy popular government, the following basis for partition seems to me the one best calculated to procure these results. Exclusive of East Prussia, Germany should be divided at the time of the armistice into the following three separate states, the boundaries being determined primarily by cultural, historic, and economic factors:

1. A new state of southern Germany, comprising the former sovereign nations of Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden, and Hesse-Darmstadt, together with those regions which may roughly be defined as the Rhineland and the Saar. It will be noted that the populations which would be comprised within this division are predominantly Catholic.
2. A state consisting of the following old German subdivisions, together with the smaller subdivisions contiguous to them: Upper Hesse, Thuringia, Westphalia, Hanover, Oldenburg, and Hamburg.
3. A state, omitting the enumeration of small contiguous political subdivisions, composed of Prussia (exclusive of East Prussia), Mecklenburg, and Saxony. It will be noted again that in the second and third states the populations are predominantly