

Zionist Policy.

You are aware that our policy in Palestine is based upon the Balfour declaration of November, 1917, by which we undertook to promote the establishment of a national home for the Jews, subject to the condition that the civil and religious rights of the rest of the population were not to be prejudiced. We have been doing our best to honour both parts of that declaration. Our High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel, has displayed not only administrative abilities of the highest order, but also the strictest impartiality, in dealing with the conflicting interests of the inhabitants of Palestine. A Jew himself, he has never been accused of showing undue favour to the Jews. On the contrary, his high sense of justice is recognized and applauded in every quarter.

Nevertheless, opposition to the so-called Zionist policy has continued. It came to a head in May, 1921, when the Jaffa outbreak took place. In the following June the late Government published a definition of what was meant by the "national home," with a view to allaying Arab apprehensions. The Arab spokesmen were not satisfied, and decided to send a delegation to London to place their case before the Government. The delegation stayed in London for nearly a year, but in spite of much discussion it was not found possible to come to terms with them. What did happen was that a fresh statement of policy was issued in June, 1922, which made important advances towards meeting the Arab views. The statement was officially accepted by the Zionists, but not by the Arab delegation, who returned to Palestine after its publication. The new policy included the establishment of a Legislative Council on a partially elected basis. The elections for this Council were fixed for the early part of this year. Owing to Arab abstentions, an insufficient number of secondary electors were returned, and the project of setting up a Legislative Council had to be suspended. The Arab politicians have, in fact, adopted an attitude of non-co-operation with the Government. They have received a good deal of encouragement from various quarters, both in England and elsewhere. We shall, of course, continue to carry out our obligations: there can be no doubt whatever on that point. But the present unrest is undoubtedly doing harm, and we should be glad to see it brought to an end without delay. The matter is engaging our active attention.

Transjordania.

Perhaps I ought to add a word about Trans-Jordan. To this region, though it is covered by our mandate for Palestine, the Zionist policy does not apply. We have there an administration under an Arab ruler, assisted by a British adviser. The ruler is the Emir Abdullah, a brother of King Feisal of Iraq and a son of the King of the Hejaz. On the whole the experiment has worked well, though the position is not altogether free from anxiety.

Conclusion.

That is all that I wish to lay before the Conference this morning. I shall be very glad to supply further information on any point connected with the colonies and protectorates, or with the Middle East, in which any member of the Conference may be interested, and I need not say that we shall welcome any advice or counsel which may be forthcoming from any of the delegates in the handling of the large and complex responsibilities which devolve upon the Colonial Office.

APPENDIX III.

STATEMENTS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS AS REGARDS THE TURKISH TREATY AND THE REPARATIONS PROBLEM.

5TH OCTOBER, 1923.

I. TURKISH TREATY.

Lord Curzon: Two years ago, when I spoke here about the position in Anatolia, where the Turkish and Greek armies were ranged opposite to each other, hostilities between them had just recommenced. The fighting began with a preliminary success, but ended in an early check, to the Greeks.

My object throughout, for I acted as representative of His Majesty's Government in the many Allied conversations and conferences that took place, was to bring these ill-judged and ill-fated hostilities to a close. They could do no good to either party. They were desolating one of the fairest regions in Asia. The Greeks were unlikely to win, and, even if they did win, had neither the men nor the resources to maintain an advanced position in Asia Minor. The Turks would probably triumph in the long-run, but only at a heavy cost.

Throughout 1921 and 1922, therefore, my time was largely consumed at conferences in London and in Paris in the attempt to bring about Allied intervention, and to persuade both parties to place their case in our hands. I was a firm believer in united action—*i.e.*, in Allied action. His Majesty's Government at no stage had a policy as distinct from the Allies, and to this policy we loyally and unswervingly adhered. But my task was not rendered easier by the notorious agreement