

Schedule III.

State.	COLUMN 1. Garrison Troops. (Existing Peace Establishment.)						COLUMN 2. Field Force. (Existing Peace Establishment, with slight modifications.)						COLUMN 3. Grand Total of Existing Military Establishments, 31st March, 1901.	COLUMN 4. Field Force. (Proposed War Establishment.)					
	Mounted Troops.	Artillery.	Infantry.	Others.	Field Guns and Guns of Position.	Total.	Mounted Troops.	Artillery.	Infantry.	Others.	Guns.	Total.		Mounted Troops.	Artillery.	Infantry.	Others.	Guns.	Total.
New South Wales	225	845	3,048	794	4	4,912	1,609	170	2,758	283	10	4,820	9,732	3,754	989	4,351	1,225	32	10,819
Victoria ..	161	1,313	1,456	263	10	3,193	1,002	183	1,989	85	12	3,259	6,452	3,333	879	3,863	1,088	29	9,163
Queensland ..	310	476	1,678	215	4	2,679	884	105	1,332	130	6	2,501	5,180	1,378	363	1,597	450	12	3,788
South Australia ..	112	341	937	119	6	1,509	630	..	834	28	..	1,492	3,001	1,007	265	1,166	329	9	2,767
Western Australia	120	211	840	34	4	1,205	360	90	450	55	4	985	2,190	508	134	589	166	4	1,897
Tasmania ..	180	259	1,426	107	2	1,972	189	64	738	53	4	1,044	3,016	478	126	554	156	4	1,814
Total ..	1,108	3,445	9,385	1,532	30	15,470	4,674	612	8,181	634	36	14,101	29,571	10,458	2,756	12,120	3,414	90	28,748

1. A slight increase in the peace establishment of the troops allotted to the Garrison Force in column 1 will be required hereafter.

2. The proportion of the various arms in the Field Force upon the peace establishment now existing in each State as given in column 2 will require some readjustment hereafter, in order to meet the proportion proposed in the war establishments. It will be observed that the proportion of mounted troops to infantry on the proposed war establishment of the Field Force in column 4 is much larger than in the existing peace establishment in column 2.

3. The figures given in column 4, exclusive of the totals, are only approximate, as the exact allotment of each unit to the States has not yet been fixed.

4. It will be seen that the following summary shows, upon a war footing, 44,218 of all arms, with 120 field guns and guns of position, viz. :—

Summary of Schedule III.

Arm.	Garrison Troops.	Field Force.	Total.
Mounted troops	1,108	10,458	11,566
Artillery	3,445	2,756	6,201
Infantry	9,385	12,120	21,505
Others	1,532	3,414	4,946
Total	15,470	28,748	44,218

Number of troops available for and constitution of Field Force in peace and war.

In the first instance, without adding to the existing numbers of the military forces, there will be available as a Field Force upon a peace footing 4,674 mounted troops, 612 field artillery, with 36 guns, and 8,815 infantry, &c., making a total of 14,101. This Force will be increased upon war footing as proposed to 10,458 mounted troops, 2,756 artillery, and 15,534 infantry and others, with 90 field guns and guns of position.

I recommend that the Field Force shall be organized into six brigades of light horse and into three brigades of infantry, each complete, with all the necessary departmental troops, and with the latest modern proportion of field artillery. The large proportion of mounted troops to infantry will necessitate a partial reconstruction of infantry into mounted troops. This change is not only consistent with the characteristics of the Australian people, but provides exactly that description of fighting-man which has proved so valuable in South Africa, and which, without doubt, would constitute a most powerful, if not a controlling, factor in any campaign in which Australian troops might be engaged.

Necessity for organization in times of peace.

Success in modern war, either for defensive or for offensive operations, can only be assured by deliberate, slow organization in times of peace. History and modern events alike testify that armed men only, no matter how brave and no matter how deeply endowed with military qualifications, are powerless to successfully, and for any length of time, oppose an army which has in times of peace been perfected by measured organization, matured by scientific preparation for war, and supplied with the latest military equipment.

It will be dangerous in the extreme to rely upon organizing when the emergency arises such troops as may be required for the defensive-offensive operations referred to, and it will be more especially unwise for a country which for some time at least must depend to a great extent for its