

would not be justified in basing policy on the belief that the will to peace (and hence our security objectives) can be secured by the mere insertion of "democratization" provisions in a peace treaty. The future of democracy and peaceful tendencies in Japan is still uncertain. In spite of the complete and apparently willing submission of the Japanese people to the occupation and the display of enthusiasm for democratic concepts, few competent observers are now prepared to be sure that this attitude indicates a change of any permanence. Moreover, positive democracy can not be imposed from outside; this way of thinking and feeling must be developed by the Japanese people themselves.

In short, the evidence suggests that it would be best to concentrate primarily on making a success of physical disarmament even while fully recognizing that repressive control will offer no final guarantee of security unless accompanied by positive measures of democratization and rehabilitation which will give to the Japanese the possibility of reasonable prosperity and the incentive to work towards replacing their old way of life and thought by a democratic system developed by themselves. Every effort should be made to ensure that the framework of physical disarmament and security controls is set in such a way as not to burden the prospective growth of democratic tendencies or to revitalize within Japan those forces responsible for her original career of aggression. Nevertheless, in cases of doubt the substance of physical disarmament should not be sacrificed for the shadow of hypothetical democratic reform.

3. THE FRAMEWORK OF PREVIOUS DECISIONS

The broad lines of the treaty have already been laid down by the Cairo, Yalta, and Potsdam Agreements.¹ In addition, many of the policy decisions of the eleven-nation Far Eastern Commission² though subject to change by the same nations at the Peace Conference, must be recognized as founded on a sound appreciation of the situation in Japan and therefore a reasonable and almost inevitable basis for the more permanent provisions of the treaty. Some of the orders of SCAP to the Japanese Government,³ also, will require to be given some degree of permanence in the peace settlement. Certain basic objectives of the Allied Powers have already been laid down:—

(a) In the *Potsdam Declaration* of 26 July, 1945, it was laid down, among other things—

¹ See Appendix 2.

² A collection of these decisions is available for consultation.

³ The more important of these Orders have been published by the Department of External Affairs in publication No. 29, "Select Documents on the Surrender and Control of Japan." A more complete collection is available for consultation.