

private members, to appoint a Legislative Committee to examine and report, as is now done in France and in several Continental States, where parliamentary government exists. The whole system of party government could, in this manner, be quietly and effectually got rid of. There would be no striking at Ministers through their policy; no rejecting of good measures in order to bring about a change of Government. Members would be in a position to discuss measures on their merits, or, at all events, without permitting party questions to influence them. There would be no weak Governments, and no danger to the liberties of the people from too strong ones. As Ministers would not be appointed because they belonged to a party, there would be no motive for turning them out of office. They would be in deed and in truth the Ministers, not the masters of Parliament.

I do not imagine, however, that we shall ever get rid of party altogether; nor is it necessary or desirable that we should. But it is desirable that we should do away with party as it is; that we should get rid of the bitterness of party feeling, the dishonesty of party tactics, and the evils inherent in the system of party government. It would be a gain to society if we could divest politics of its mean and mercenary character. But wherever men have strong convictions, and are earnest in the propagation of them, they will always combine and organize in order the more effectually to secure their adoption by the public. We shall still have party, therefore; in politics, as in other departments of human knowledge, there will always be at least two parties—the party for things as they are, and the party for things as they ought to be. The “spoils for the victors” would, however, be no longer the motto of party warfare. The victory, to whichever side it turned, would be one of principles; the prize of contention would not be place or patronage, but the favour and gratitude of a great nation.—*David Syme, “Representative Government in England.”*

A Cabinet Government—that is, a government chosen by the King out of the party which has the majority in the House of Commons—is only one out of many forms of representative government. It suits us because it is like our other institutions, the growth of our own soil; but it by no means follows that it can be transplanted whole into other countries, or even into our own colonies.—*Earl Grey.*

If a man could shake out of his mind the universal noise of political doctors in this generation and in the last generation or two, and consider the matter face to face with his own sincere intelligence looking at it, I venture to say he would find government by a party a very extraordinary method of navigating.—*Carlyle.*

Under our present parliamentary system the average member is, in truth, seldom called on to exercise a perfectly independent judgment on particular questions of importance. He exercises his judgment once for all when he decides whether he will support or oppose the Ministry; by that division his subsequent votes are for the most part determined. Whether this is a high state of political morality may well be doubted. . . . True men should owe allegiance to measures, not to party. . . . A party man—whether a member of the Government party or of the Opposition—has to support measures of which he does not approve, and to oppose measures of which he does approve. . . . No man worth calling a man can be in accord with any leader on all points, for every man thinks differently from every other man.—*Freeman.*

THE FOLLOWING IS A TRANSLATION OF PART OF THE LAW CONSTITUTING THE SWISS EXECUTIVE, CALLED THE FEDERAL COUNCIL.

ART. I. The Federal Council is the directive and highest executive authority of the Confederation. It is composed of seven members, appointed for three years by the Federal Assembly, and chosen from amongst all the Swiss citizens who are eligible for the National Council. There must not be more than one member from the same Canton. The Federal Council is appointed after each election of the National Council. The vacancies which take place during the three years are filled at the first session of the Federal Assembly for the remainder of the term.

ART. III. The parents and relations both in a direct and collateral line, the parents and relations to the degree of cousins-german inclusive, and also the husbands of sisters, cannot sit at the same time in the Federal Council. The same degree of relationship must not exist between a member of the Federal Council and the Chancellor, his substitute, the Keeper of the Records, the Registrar; nor between a member of the Federal Council and the secretary of his department and their high subordinate Federal functionaries. As a rule the Federal Council cannot nominate as secretaries of departments or as high Federal functionaries any persons who are in the above-indicated relationship to one of its members. A member of the Federal Council or a high official who enters into a marriage contract which is within the prohibited degree of relationship must resign his post. A special Act will designate the functionaries to whom the above regulations are applicable, and until that Act has become law the Federal Council shall decide.

ART. IV. A member of the Federal Council cannot, either by himself or proxy during the continuance of his duties, take any other employment, neither in the service of the Confederation nor in a Canton, nor follow any other calling or profession.

ART. VI. The Federal Council is presided over by the President of the Confederation. There is also a Vice-President. The President of the Confederation and the Vice-President of the Federal Council are nominated for one year by the Federal Assembly from among the members of the Council. The President on leaving office cannot be elected President or Vice-President for the following year. The same member cannot take office again as Vice-President for the two following years.