if its full grammatical meaning be given to it, the proviso will produce injustice so enormous that the mind of any reasonable man must revolt from it. When the language of the Legislature construed literally involves such consequences, the Court has over and over again acted upon the view that the Legislature could not have intended to produce a result which would be palpably unjust, and would revolt the mind of any reasonable man, unless they have manifested that intention by express words. The Court will not infer such an intention from the use of merely general words." Then, your Honours, there is the case, which was only decided in 1889—that of Coluquhun *v.* Brooks, in the House of Lords. This was a question on the income-tax (14 Appeal Cases, p. 506). This is Lord Herschel's judgment: "It is beyond dispute, too, that we are entitled, and, indeed, bound, when construing the terms of any provision found in a statute, to consider any other parts of the Act which throw light upon the intention of the Legislature, and which may serve to show that the particular provision ought not to be construed as it would be if considered alone and apart from the rest of the Act." That is the only part of the judgment which deals with this point that I am arguing; for I wish now to cite just two or three other cases to show how the express words of one section may be held to be limited by another section in comparing them. There is a case of Moyle *v.* Jenkins (51 Law Journal, Queen's Bench, p. 112). This action was under "The Employers' Limited Liability Act, 1880," and the question arose in this way: Section 4 deals with giving a notice, but it does not say whether the notice is to be in writing or orally; but section 7 provides how the notice shall be served, and they say that the general words of section 4 are thereby limited, and the words "in writing" are to be construed as coming within it. That is practically what the decision says. Mr. Justice Grove says,—

"This rule must be discharged. Our duty is simply to construe the statute according to the usual rules of interpretation. If we were to adopt Mr. Crump's contention we should be legislating and not interpreting the statute. If the 4th section stood alone the defendant's argument would no doubt be worthy of grave consideration. But there is the 7th section, containing the essential requisites of a notice, which means the notice required to be given under the 4th section. The 4th section deals with the time for giving a notice; the 7th section contains the requisites of the notice, and its terms clearly show that a written notice was necessary. There can be no question here as to any inaccuracy in the notice, because there was no notice at all."

And so on. The 4th section is this: "An action for recovery under this Act of compensation for an injury shall not be maintainable unless notice that injury has been sustained is given within six weeks." That is all—unless notice is given within six weeks. Section 7 says, "Notice of injury under this Act shall give the name and address of the person injured, and shall state in ordinary language the cause of the injury, and the date at which it was sustained, and shall be served on the employer. The notice may be served by delivering the same to, or at the residence or place of business of, the person on whom it is to be served. A notice under this section shall not be deemed invalid"—and so on.

The Chief Justice: A stronger case than that is that of Reg. *v.* Shurmer (17 Q.B. Div.).

Sir R. Stout: That case was referred to, I think, in a Gisborne murder-case which came before the Court of Appeal. I appeared in that case. Then there is the case of the Queen *v.* Mount (Law Reports, 6 Privy Council, p. 283). The part of the judgment I wish to refer to is at page 300, and it will be seen from the interpretation put upon a statute by the Privy Council that they practically struck three words out of the statute—the words "now in force"—by saying that what they thought must have been intended by the policy of the Act. This is what is said at the bottom of page 300:—

"On this question their Lordships think that, although the Imperial Act abolishing transportation does not in terms include the colonies, it is applicable to them with respect to the sentences to be passed on persons convicted in the colonies of offences only triable there by virtue of the Admiralty jurisdiction conferred by the Imperial Act on colonial Courts. Such offences might be tried after that Act, either in England or the colonies, and the Legislature clearly expressed its intention that the punishment should be the same wherever the trial might take place. This general interest and policy should, therefore, govern the construction of the Acts, unless it plainly appears from the language of the later statute that the Legislature meant to change it.

"The words 'now in force,' in the original Act, no doubt apply in terms to the existing law. But the latter part of the section, directing that the punishment should be the same as it would have been if the offence 'were inquired of, tried, and adjudged in England,' shows with distinctness that the Imperial Legislature was conferring power upon the colonies to try offences properly cognisable in England, with the consequences which would have attended a trial there. The punishment was accordingly directed to be the same as it would have been by the existing law if the offence had been tried in England.

"When the Imperial Legislature altered that law, and substituted penal servitude for transportation, it is reasonable to suppose that the alteration was intended to embrace sentences for offences tried in the colonies under the special jurisdiction conferred by the 12 and 13 Vict., since there is no trace of any intention on the part of the Legislature to change the policy of that Act, which orders these sentences to be passed according to the law of England."

And so on. I submit that that again shows that they will allow what may be called the policy of the law to control the interpretation of the statute. And now I come to the next question, dealing with this interpretation, before I deal with the Act itself. Is the Civil List Act to be read along with "The Supreme Court Act, 1882." My contention to the Court is that this Civil List Act is to be read as if it had been re-enacted as part of the Supreme Court Act itself; and the mere fact of its having been placed in a different statute will not make any difference in its interpretation along with "The Supreme Court Act, 1882;" in fact, it is to be construed as the text-books on the interpretation of statutes laid down *in pari materiâ* with "The Supreme Court Act, 1882." These are pro-