

I told him there could be no doubt of it whatever; that already we had heard that a bitter feeling of resentment against the Mother-country had been aroused; and that his own agents, I felt confident, would tell him the same story. I told him I had in my pocket a copy of a telegram from the Prime Minister of Victoria, one of the most important of the Australian Group. I had not intended, of course, to read it to him, but that under the circumstances I would do so confidentially. It ran as follows: "At last the end has come. Information received reliable source that Germany has hoisted flag on New Britain, New Ireland, and north coast of New Guinea. The exasperation here is boundless. We protest in the name of the present and future of Australia. If England does not yet save us from the danger and disgrace as far, at least, as New Guinea is concerned, the bitterness of feeling towards her will not die out with this generation. We now appeal in terms Derby, despatch 11th July, 1883, second paragraph." I explained that this despatch stated that, if there had been any evidence of a foreign Power intending to take possession of any part of New Guinea, Her Majesty's Government would have taken it without the delay of more than a few hours, and that Her Majesty's Government were satisfied then—in July, 1883—that no such step was contemplated by any foreign Power.

The Prince then argued that this strip of New Guinea was very small and of little value to England. I said that it included the Maclay coast, in which we were specially interested; and I asked him whether Germany would think of annexing land, with or without value, which she had just proposed should form the subject of special negotiation.

He seemed displeased at this question, and rather sharply replied that that sort of question should be treated on general grounds of policy. Up to two years ago he had done everything he could to facilitate English policy in Egypt and elsewhere; but for some time past he has been treated in a different manner by England, whose actions do not accord with her professions. As for Samoa, it was all very well for me to propose that its independence should be respected; but that was no concession to Germany: she and the United States, equally with England, had interests in that island. With regard to Angra Pequena, he said that he attached no value to these islands. He said that the guano would soon be exhausted, when they would become valueless. I then showed him a map, which, at my request, Mr. Bolton had prepared for me, which I told him showed the islands which I had suggested might be ceded, under certain conditions, to Germany. He interrupted me with the question, "Including Walfisch Bay?" To which I replied, "Oh, no. That is a regular British settlement on the mainland: I am only proposing to deal with the islands." I then showed him their position, remarking that they were as much British territory as the soil on which Berlin stands is German territory; and I thought it would be very inconvenient to Germany to have islands subject to a foreign jurisdiction close to her new territory, and some lying in the very mouth of the principal harbour.

Prince Bismarck said he had considered this, and attached no importance to it. He made no alternative proposal, and he wound up by saying, "I do not find your proposals sufficient."

I expressed my regret that this was so, saying that I was in the painful position of falling between two stools, as he rejected my scheme and I had not in any way been authorized by my own Government to propose it. With this my visit terminated.

Berlin, 24th December, 1884.

R. M.

Enclosure 2 in No. 4.

MEMORANDUM by Mr. MEADE.

AFTER my visit to Prince Bismarck I thought that it would be useful if I went to see Dr. Busch, and explain to him the view I had expressed to Prince Bismarck of the correspondence which had passed between our two Governments.

Dr. Busch began by explaining to me that he was desirous of assuring me that when he saw me he was not aware of the orders given, or that the German flag was, in fact, already hoisted on the north coast of New Guinea; that he was only imperfectly informed on the subject; but he was anxious to remove from my mind any feeling that he had acted unfairly.

I entirely accepted his assurances, and went on to tell him what I had told the Chancellor, and especially what I had said respecting our two notes of the 19th September and the 9th October, on which I contended we had not been fairly treated, and that, as Prince Bismarck would speak to him, I wanted to make my point quite clear to him. He then sent for M. de Kusserow, as being thoroughly conversant with the matter, and I found that they put an interpretation on these communications of a wholly different character. They look upon our second note as a final withdrawal from any claim to go to the northward of the limit we then fixed; and that the question to be diplomatically treated was not whether we should ultimately go further up the coast, but merely how far inland towards the interior from the south coast. M. de Kusserow reminded me that, when a question was asked in Parliament as to our limits inland, the reply was that it would depend on local requirements, and would be decided later; and this was the question, in their view, which was left open for diplomatic treatment.

I altogether denied this, and I begged them, before seeing the Chancellor, to look at the two notes from the British Embassy and at the communication made by Baron von Plessen, and they would see that the two notes hung together, that the interior limits were in no way referred to, and that the sole question to be diplomatically considered, or referred to the Committee, was how far up the coast we should go beyond our temporary limits.

They told me that in July or August of this year Count Münster was ordered to tell us that a German expedition was going to the north coast of New Guinea, and that they were apprehensive of the jealousy of the Australian Colonies, who had actually recommended that everything in that quarter of the globe, not already British territory, should be at once annexed. Later, Count Münster was desired to leave an *aide-memoire* with Lord Granville, so that their intentions might