

siderable number of local enactments before they left England, which they could pass immediately on their arrival in this country.

In reference to the proportions which I have recommended should be ultimately observed in the Provincial Legislative Councils between the number of members nominated by Her Majesty and those elected by the people, I should state that I thought it better to name in the first instance such a proportion rather than to name any specific number of persons as that which Her Majesty might call to these Councils; because in several provinces, with such various amounts of population, great differences must exist in the size of the respective Councils; and in those provinces in which the Native population is large it may be necessary to call to the Council the Native Secretary, the Surveyor-General, and other officers whose presence might not be required in the Councils of other provinces. Upon the whole, therefore, I thought it better to name the proportions I have done as those which should be first adopted, leaving it to the General Assembly, with the assent of Her Majesty, to make any alterations in those proportions which experience might hereafter point out as necessary.

It appears unnecessary for me to enter into any detail upon the subject of the various reasons which have led me to recommend that the several powers of legislation I have previously mentioned should be conferred respectively upon the General Assembly and the Provincial Legislative Councils. The general object I have in these respects had in view was, as I have before stated, to constitute one general Legislature for the whole territory, with complete powers of legislation, who upon all subjects of general interest could pass laws which would prevail throughout the whole of the New Zealand Islands; yet at the same time to make ample provision for the existing difficulties of communication and for the scattered state of the settlements by providing legislative bodies which, whilst they had large powers for the purposes of local legislation, were precluded from legislating upon subjects of general interest. It is also proposed to prohibit them from legislating upon points connected with the Natives, all such questions being reserved for the General Assembly, where the number of representatives from different provinces, some of which will be in no manner mixed up with Native questions, will probably insure an impartial and dispassionate consideration of such questions.

I have recommended your Lordship to sanction the principle of the direct election of the representatives to the several Chambers, instead of causing them to be returned through the intervention of another body, because the whole of my experience in these colonies induces me to think that the system which I have recommended will work far better in practice than any other, and because I believe it will be more agreeable to the wishes of the settlers themselves.

In the various provisions which I have introduced into the enclosed Ordinance, relating to the amount of the civil list which is to be reserved, its appropriation, &c., I have followed the exact words of the Constitution which was sent out by your Lordship, the whole of these provisions appearing to me, with one exception, to be most excellent. The one I allude to is the amount of the civil list to be reserved in each province; and in respect to that, looking to the large amount of the Native population, and the sums that they will contribute to the revenue, whilst they will be nearly wholly unrepresented, I think it might be more prudent upon the whole to reserve for the next few years a civil list of £10,000 per annum in each province. In fact, I think that the reservation of a larger civil list might enable representative institutions to be introduced into New Zealand at an earlier period than would otherwise be prudently done by reserving a sum which could be applied for the benefit of that large portion of the Native population who, whilst they will contribute largely to the revenue, will under a system of representative Government have no voice as to the mode in which it is to be applied, an evil which I confess I can never contemplate without a great degree of apprehension.

In proposing the rate of franchise which I have named in this despatch, I have been influenced by the desire of including among the voters all those persons who have acquired or are acquiring small properties on which they intend to reside themselves during the remainder of their lives, and to settle them on their children. Persons of this class have such a stake in the colony that they will sincerely desire its prosperity and welfare. They are also, generally speaking, an extremely religious well-conducted class of persons, and, as owners of property, are required to make themselves acquainted with a large class of subjects which are seldom brought under the notice of persons of their condition in England; I think, therefore, that the right of giving a vote may with great safety be left in their hands.

Having thus given an outline of the form of Government which I recommend should be ultimately introduced into these Islands, your Lordship will see that the measure which I have now transmitted for Her Majesty's approval makes all the necessary preparations for the introduction of such a Constitution. Parliament has already constituted in New Zealand a General Council, composed of persons to be nominated by Her Majesty, which possesses all the powers which I propose should be conferred upon the General Assembly, whilst the Ordinance I have now the honour to enclose creates Provincial Legislative Councils, composed of persons to be nominated by Her Majesty, which Councils will possess all the powers which I propose should be eventually conferred upon the Provincial Legislative Councils. In point of fact, therefore, the merits of the Constitution I propose should be ultimately introduced into New Zealand will, in so far as the working of the several legislative bodies is concerned, both for the whole territory and for the several provinces, be immediately tested by actual practice, and any errors which may have been committed in the faulty balancing of their respective powers can be readily adjusted; whilst, should Her Majesty think proper ultimately to confer upon New Zealand such a Constitution as I have recommended, there will exist, if the Ordinance I have now transmitted is approved, at the period of the introduction of such a Constitution—(1stly) A general Legislature for the whole Islands, which can adjust the details of the Constitution, by aiding the Governor-in-Chief with their advice as to the proportional number of representatives which should be returned from each province; and (2ndly) There would also exist in each province a legislative body who would aid in dividing the province into electoral districts, in proportioning the number of representatives to the several districts, in determining the polling places, and in many of the details which could not properly be adjusted without the intervention of some such bodies.