

## Enclosure 2.

COPY OF A MEMORANDUM BY MR. STAFFORD.

Colonial Secretary's Office,  
Auckland, 30th July, 1860.Sir William Denison's  
Despatch of 13th July

The last paragraph of Sir William Denison's Despatch of the 13th of July, 1860, is calculated to produce such erroneous and mischievous impressions that it appears to Your Excellency's Ministers to require some notice. The paragraph referred to is as follows :—

"In the last paragraph of your Despatch you say that vessels conveying Troops should be directed to come into Manukau Harbour, whence they can be despatched to Taranaki or landed for Auckland, as may be required. With reference to this, I would observe that the only ground upon which I should feel justified in detaching to New Zealand so large a portion of the force required for the defence of these Colonies is the necessity of placing in the hands of the Officer in Command such a number of men as may enable him to overcome at once the opposition of the Natives ; and I must, both as Governor-General of Australia and as a Military man, protest against the dissemination of these troops in small detachments for the purpose of securing the Inhabitants of particular districts from possible attacks from the Maoris,—attacks which, if they do take place, can have no effect upon the result of the war, but which, if prevented by the presence of detachments of Troops, by which the force at the disposal of the Officer in Command is rendered ineffective, can only prolong a state of things which, for the sake of the Colony itself, should be terminated as speedily as possible."

In this paragraph Sir William Denison assumes two premises from which he draws his conclusion :

1. That it was contemplated by the Government of New Zealand to disseminate the Troops despatched from Australia in "small detachments for the purpose of securing the Inhabitants of particular districts from possible attacks by the Maoris."
2. That the attacks contemplated by the New Zealand Government when requesting that those Troops should be first sent to Manukau for orders, if made, could have no effect on the result of the war.

And upon the assumption that these are facts, Sir William Denison takes the responsibility of altering arrangements made by Your Excellency with the full concurrence of your Ministers, and protests, "both as Governor-General of Australia and as a Military man," against your proceedings.

So far from the Government of New Zealand disseminating Troops in small detachments the very reverse has been the fact. From the moment that the state of affairs became serious at Taranaki it has been the policy and endeavour of the Government of New Zealand to concentrate at the seat of active operations every available man. The garrisons were removed from the principal towns—at Auckland only twenty-seven men fit for duty were left, at Wellington none ; and the defence of these places was entrusted to Volunteers and an untrained Militia. If an error has been committed it has not been that of keeping Her Majesty's Troops in garrisons "for the purpose of securing the inhabitants of particular districts from possible attack," but rather that "of exposing the Military Magazines and large stores of munitions of war, both public and private property, to the risk of falling into the hands of those who are in arms against Her Majesty's authority."

It is not improbable that the present Insurrection may be brought to a conclusion only from the want of arms, ammunition, and food on the part of the Insurgents, and to expose all these in abundance is to offer an almost irresistible temptation to disaffected Natives. Yet so important did it appear, for Imperial as well as Colonial interests, to enable the Commanding Officer at New Plymouth to strike an effective blow without delay, that rather than cripple him for want of any assistance that could possibly be afforded in the Colony, the risk of removing all the regular Troops was incurred, even at a time when danger appeared imminent.

The present state of the Native population in this Colony is altogether misunderstood by Sir William Denison.

The Province of Taranaki, by the last census, taken in 1857-8, contained but 3000 Natives of all ages and both sexes. It is amongst them, that the Insurrection has broken out, but it is not from them that any real danger is to be apprehended. Alone and unaided their Insurrection would not be dangerous beyond Taranaki, and would be readily put down there, but it is the support which they expect and partially receive from the Tribes of the Waikato which constitutes their strength and our danger.

Hitherto the Waikato Tribes have done no more than furnish some contingents to the Taranaki War, but it always has been, and is still, uncertain how long this partial inaction will continue. The meeting held at Waiuku—an English settlement about forty miles from Auckland—at which it was deliberately resolved to attack Auckland ; the subsequent great Native Conference at Ngaurawahia on the Waikato river, held avowedly to determine the question of peace or war with the white man ; the unexpected, but entire, adhesion to the King party given in at the meeting by the Lower Waikato Tribes, who had previously stood aloof ; the death of the Maori King Potatau, rendering it uncertain whether the more warlike counsel would not prevail under a successor ; the doubt, and uncertainty still hanging over the intentions and proceedings of the Waikato Tribes, and